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ABSTRACT
We present the observation of distributed denial-of-service
attacks that use reection of the ooding trac o reec-
tors. This type of attack was used in massive attacks against
internet infrastructure of Czech Republic in March, 2013.
Apart from common hosts in the network, honeypots were
abused as the reectors. It caused the false positive inci-
dent detection and helped attackers. Honeypots, which are
by default set to accept any incoming network connection,
unintentionally amplied the eect of reection. We present
an analysis of the attack from the point of view of honey-
pots and show the risks of having honeypots respond to any
incoming trac. We also discuss the possibilities of attack
detection and mitigation and present lessons learned from
handling the attack. We point out a lack of communication
and data sharing during the observed attack.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-communication Networks]: General|
Security and protection
Keywords
DDoS attack; reection; honeypot; mitigation; data sharing;
communication
1. INTRODUCTION
Denial-of-service attacks are a major threat to today's net-
works. They are relatively easy to perform, hard to defend
against, and the attacker is rarely traced back due to com-
mon usage of IP spoong techniques and a distributed form
of the attack.
The Distributed Reected Denial-of-Service (DRDoS) at-
tacks do not contact the victim directly, they rather spoof
source IP address of the victim and use bouncing of traf-
c o reectors instead. The spoong of victims' IP address
causes the reectors to appear as the attackers while the real
attacker is often above suspicion. Reectors do not need to
.
amplify an attack, response with the same or even smaller
amount of data is sucient for a successful attack. In addi-
tion, any host in the network can be abused as a reector,
i. e., server, workstation or honeypot.
We have observed a situation where honeypots uninten-
tionally helped the attacker. Honeypots, by their nature, are
not meant to be accessed by legitimate users. If a network
trac of a honeypot is monitored and a honeypot is abused
as a reector, we can see an attempt to contact it and mark
the source IP as a potential attacker. This is natural and
legitimate procedure of malicious behavior detection but,
in case of DRDoS, we have marked spoofed address as an
attacker. Even though any network trac destined to hon-
eypot is suspicious, we cannot be sure if we have detected
the real attacker or a victim.
The involvement of honeypots in DRDoS is often ignored,
as we have observed in several attacks recently. To name
a few, abuse of honeypots was associated with the massive
DDoS attacks against Czech Republic in March, 2013. An-
other example of this type of attack was an incident from
April, 2013, when we detected an IP address, which was
part of a DDoS mitigation service. In both cases, the actual
victim was reported and as an attacker initiating unsolicited
connections to honeypots.
This paper is organized in six sections. We recount the
recent DDoS attacks and the role of honeypots in them in
Section 2. We point out the importance of proper cong-
uration of honeypots to eliminate the reection in Section
3. The possibilities of detection and mitigation of the at-
tacks and handling issues for which organizations should be
prepared are described in Section 4 and 5. The paper is
concluded in Section 6.
2. DDOS ATTACKS AGAINST CZECH RE-
PUBLIC
In March 2013, Czech Republic was a target of DDoS
attacks which lasted 4 consecutive days. It was the rst
time the entire country had to face an attack of this volume.
Online media, banks and mobile operators were gradually
under DDoS attacks from Monday, March 4 to Thursday,
March 7 in working hours between 8AM and 5PM (CET).
The attacker used two types of DDoS attack with volume
up to 1Gbps [1] and initiated the attack with the knowledge
of the Czech internet. The reason for the attack is unknown
but it has shown how prepared the Czech community is for
these attacks.
The attacks started with a SYN ood attack on Monday
and Tuesday and were aimed against more than a dozen on-
line media virtually hosted on a few servers, and the most
popular Czech search engine Seznam.cz. According to DDoS
attacks taxonomy [5], it was a brute-force attack using ran-
domly spoofed source IP addresses with uctuating rate.
Even though the attack was simple and the bandwidth was
low, overload of the virtual hosting denied access to many
web pages. We believe that the goal of these attacks was to
attract the attention of media.
On Wednesday and Thursday the attack continued with
reected SYN ood attack. The attacks were aimed against
websites of major Czech banks and two mobile operators.
According to the taxonomy [5], it was a brute-force attack
using xed spoofed source IP address with uctuating rate
known as the DRDoS attack. As shown in Figure 1, it is a
form of a DDoS attack that bounces the ooding trac o
of reectors by spoong requests from the victim to Internet
hosts that will send replies to the victim [6]. These attacks
are based on willingness of improperly congured servers
and computers to respond to incoming packets. Reected
attacks due to their nature are harder to trace and lter.
According to CESNET, the Czech NREN1, 68% connections
on random destination port were accepted and responded to
with SYN+ACK. It was approximately 1.5million packets
per 5 minutes.
Figure 1: Schema of the reected attack
Honeypots became great reectors for the DRDoS attack.
We observed that honeypots from another Czech university
reected 93% of all incoming packets. Hosts in the network
of Masaryk University reected approximately 5% of incom-
ing packets while honeypots alone reected 16% of incoming
packets. Figure 2 shows a trac peak from honeypots that
was stopped shortly after the false positive detection and
ltering of the actual victim.
3. HONEYPOT SETTINGS AND VULNER-
ABILITIES
Traditionally, there are two approaches to honeypot im-
plementation, high-interaction and low-interaction honey-
pots [2]. These implementations dier in a level of possi-
ble interaction between a honeypot and an attacker. High-
interaction honeypots are usually deployed as the virtual
machines with a real operating system and applications.
They do not dier from the real hosts on the network and
they are not often deployed in large numbers. The low-
interaction honeypots are usually emulators of systems or
their parts. The settings of these honeypots are limited
as well as the possible countermeasures while they are cheap
to deploy and often deployed in large numbers.














Figure 2: Incoming and outgoing TCP trac on
honeypots { Thursday, March 7, 2013 from 10AM
to 2PM
There are popular tools among the honeypot community,
a low-interaction honeypot honeyd [7] and a tarpit LaBrea [4].
Honeyd is a small daemon that creates virtual hosts in the
network. There are two potential vulnerabilities in its de-
ployment, the number of emulated hosts and settings of their
port actions. Any port on any host (including defaults)
emulated by honeyd can be set in three ways, 1) open re-
sponds with TCP SYN+ACK packet, 2) reset responds with
TCP RST packet and 3) block is not responding. Honey-
pots are generally congured to accept any incoming con-
nection, e. g., open, to capture potential attacks including
zero-day exploits. The problem is that honeypots accept
and respond also to spoofed packets. The ports open by de-
fault are the reason why honeypots reect more trac than
common hosts in the network. Next, tarpits like LaBrea
include additional potentially hazardous ability. They es-
tablish a TCP connection and keep it open for as long as
possible without sending much data. This ability is sup-
posed to deplete the resources of an attacker. However, in
case of reected attack the tarpit is actually depleting the
resources of the victim.
The risk of having all ports opened is multiplied by the
number of emulated hosts. For example, honeyd can emu-
late up to 65,536 addresses. As for our own honeypots, we
use honeyd emulating slightly more than 200 IP addresses.
Even this number of emulated hosts would be enough for
the attacker to execute DRDoS attack. The only limitation
of the reected trac is bandwidth of a singe host running
the honeyd.
The attacker does not need to know if the reectors are
common hosts or honeypots. It can be a coincidence to
abuse honeypots as reectors, although favorable for the at-
tacker.
The easy abuse of honeypots can be turned into honeypot
detection mechanism. Scanning for highly responsive net-
work segments reveals good reectors that are likely to be
honeypots, especially when they reply with the SYN+ACK
ags on many unusual ports. Suppressing this behavior cor-
responds with the strategy of making honeypots indistin-
guishable from common network hosts [2].
4. DETECTION AND MITIGATION
OF THE ATTACKS
The DRDoS attack is based on IP spoong and if we could
detect spoofed IP packets, we would be able recognize an at-
tack. Elimination of IP spoong would make DRDoS attacks
impossible and would enable defense mechanisms against
many other kinds of DDoS attacks [5]. The BCP38 [3] deals
with network ingress ltering that disables sending of forged
trac with a spoofed source IP address. Since the ltering
is still not always put in place we have to rely on a research
in source address validation.
Once we have detected an attack reected of our network,
we can mitigate the attack at least by dropping the connec-
tions from and to the victim. Next step should be sending
a report of reected trac to the abuse contact of the vic-
tim with data pointing to the source of the spoofed trac on
uplink level ISP. This informs the victim that we act as a re-
ector and not the actual source of attack and gives enough
information to trace the actual attacker.
It is worth noting that attackers rather succeed in sat-
uration of the link or active nodes such as rewalls, load
balancers etc., than overloading the end server. The port
is irrelevant when it comes to link saturation, however the
port 80 is more likely to be accepted by rewalls. This port
is not the only option, well-known ports are most likely to
be used.
5. COMMUNICATION AND DATA SHAR-
ING
Signicant part of the mitigation of attacks is based on
communication and sharing of data between organizations
involved in a DDoS attack. As it turned out from recent
attacks, researchers and security teams are focused mainly
on detection of attacks and their processing in a local con-
text. This approach is sucient enough for attacks on small
scale focused on one organization. However, attacks that go
across several organizations, which could act as both victims
and attackers, needs more than simple detection.
There is the best practice to use a list of ocial abuse
emails and out-of-band contacts to eliminate the delay and
a risk of losing contacts due to personal changes in organi-
zations. Recent events in March showed lack of systematic
communication between organizations which communicated
mostly ad-hoc and based on good relations between the in-
volved organizations. There were conference calls put in
place and personal contacts were used.
Sharing of data is very closely related to communication.
It helps tracing the source of attack and speeds up the anal-
ysis of attack. A shared database of detected anomalies
and incidents could make the detection and mitigation of
attacks faster and more accurate. Moreover every organiza-
tion should have summarizing information about the status
of own network, i. e. used bandwidth, count of open con-
nections, etc. This could detect involvement in attack as
reector or botnet zombies. Every mitigated attack to the
victim could lower the impact of attack, particularly if the
bandwidth of the reector is higher than victims'. The leg-
islative adjusting the work and access to personal data and
network records has to be taken into consideration, though.
There is also the need to usefully visualize the shared data
gathered during an attack. Visualization is currently ori-
ented simply on amount of trac between nodes or subnets.
It would be helpful to correlate the results of detection meth-
ods and visualize them on upper levels of network hierarchy.
This could help to react faster to early warnings and changes
in ongoing attack.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we pointed out that there is a risk in using
honeypots. However, we do not want to discourage readers
to use them. We still see the benet of honeypots being
deployed in the network but we advice against them being as
open as possible. Honeypots are still useful even for reected
trac, because they point to malicious behavior, although
in this particular case, they are reporting victim and not
the attacker. We have shown that honeypots are capable of
reporting false positives, although they were believed to be
free of false positives.
We have supported our conclusions by the observation
and analysis of real large-scale DRDoS attacks. Honeypot
settings and vulnerabilities were presented on an example
of widely-known low-interaction honeypots participating in
the attack. We also discussed the problems related to inci-
dent handling and communication during the attack. Not
only false positive detection, but overall information sharing
needs to be revised to replace observed ad-hoc solutions.
Finally, we presented lessons learned in the area of both
honeypots and attack handling, including prevention of hon-
eypot abuse and proper handling of security incidents. We
believe there is still room for improvement in communication
and data sharing associated with mitigation of attacks.
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